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1. Introduction
Liability laws are a very attractive policy instrument in a
market economy for a number of reasons. If an individual agent
inflicts a damage on another party, liability rules allow to
attribute the damage costs to the agent that caused the damage.
The originator of a damage will be forced to pay, and he will
not be able to transplant some of the social costs of his.
action on someone else. Liability will tend to bring private
and social costs in line. In principle liability therefore is
an efficient social institution of dealing with other and third
party damages.
As a rule, liability goes hand in hand with the decen-
tralization of an economic system when important economic deci-
sions are delegated to autonomous subsystems of the economy.
Thus liability is consistent with the market system. Besides an
efficient allocation of external damages, liability rules
introduce an incentive to prevent damages to third parties. If
the originator of a damage can expect to be liable for a
damage, he or she will avoid damages in the first place.
* Paper to be presented at the European Science Foundation
Workshop: "Economic Analysis for Environmental Toxicology", 24-
26 May 1989, Noordwijkerhout, The Netherlands.Liability ex post will be anticipated ex ante. Consequently,
liability will introduce incentives for new technological
solutions. Moreover, liability may be applied when damages are
uncertain, that is when other regulations are not applicable
because they cannot be defined in an uncertain world. Finally,
liability rules establish an insurance market, and it can be
assumed that such a market can generate more imaginative
solutions than a regulatory setting.
The message of liability law is straightforward: An economic
activity such as production or consumption should internalize
its liability costs. An activity should not be enganged in, if
it cannot support its liability costs. If a product cannot
carry its liability costs, it should not be on the market. This
holds for commodities already being produced as well as for new
products. A private investment project should carry its liabi-
lity costs; if it fails to do so, it should not be undertaken.
This also holds for a public project. A waste deposit or an
energy plant should carry their liability costs.
In practical environmental policy liability laws do not seem to
have a prominent place among the policy instruments being used.
An interesting intellectual task is to look for options to
introduce liability laws and to study conditions, under which
liability laws may be practical *). For our problem, we have to
keep in mind some of the properties of persistent micro-pol-
lutants such as a long half-life of months and more (and even
years), transformation in the environment such as synergisms,
uptake by organisms etc.. Most of these impacts of micro-pol-
lutants are unknown or extremely hard to observe ^); they occur
in the long-run.
A central aspect of liability is risk or uncertainty. We there-
fore have to study the risks involved in using the environment
(Section 2). In a semi-Coasean world, property rights with
liability rules allow to transform risk into deterministicvalues (Section 3). This, however, does not hold when trans-
action costs do play a decisive role (Section 4). The relation-
ship of liability law and other policy instruments is analyzed
in Section 5. In Section 6, the problems of accounting for the
risk of environmental degradation in setting the quality target
is addressed. Section 7 develops the casuistics of the environ-
mental problem relevant for liability. Finally, the results are
summarized.
2. Using the Environment under Risk
The environment has two basic functions for the economic
system: it supplies public consumption goods such as oxygen or
the protective strata of the earth's atmosphere. At the same
time, those waste products which are generated in the produc-
tion and consumption processes are channelled back into the
environment and taken in by the environment's various media,
partly broken down, accumulated and altered in their structure
(Siebert 1978, 1987a). The role of the environment as a recep-
tacle of wastes can be interpreted as a private good. The pol-
lutants ambient in the environment influence environmental qua-
lity. Due to the diffusion function a trade-off exists between
the environment's function as a public consumption good and its
role as a recipient of pollutants. This conflict of competing
uses, which is central to the environmental issue, generates
additional problems if a specific use of the environment is
encumbered with risk or uncertainty.
The notion of risk implies that the consequences of a decision
cannot be determined in a clear-cut way for the acting agent
due to inadequate information for instance on future events.
The consequences of an action are therefore "uncertain".
Variables in the economic decisions of an agent are random
variables. Risk can be interpreted as the deviation in either
direction from an expected result, i.e. the mathematicalvariance in the random variable considered plausible by the
decision taker. According to Knight (1921), risk is to be
interpreted as a measurable, i.e. quantifiable, variable. Eco-
nomic agents can assign probabilities to events happening in
the world in the future. Many authors require that probabili-
ties be based on an empirical frequency analysis so that they
acquire an objective or statistical character. In this inter-
pretation, we are concerned with a narrow concept of risk.
Uncertainty, on the other hand, may imply that no probability
can be stated or deduced from reality to determine the state of
the world, in other words that probability can only be stated
subjectively (or not at all), and not objectively. This is a
broader interpretation of risk being relevant to phenomena
where not enough experience of the past exists. References in
the following article are to this broader risk concept, unless
otherwise indicated.
A given variance in a random variable or a given probability
distribution of events does not necessarily imply the same risk
for different agents. This is due to the fact that risk can
only be defined in terms of the target function and restric-
tions of the individual agent. This applies first of all to the
differences in risk preference. But even when the attitudes
towards risk are identical among agents, what constitutes a
risk for one party is not necessarily a risk at all or an equi-
valent risk for another. A given variance in water quality
therefore represents different risks, depending on whether the
water is used for cooling, for industrial purposes, as a compo-
nent for a final product such as beer, or as drinking water.
Since the target functions of agents - maximising utility or
profit - vary, and since room for manoeuvre varies as a result
of a large number of restrictions, an uncertain event does not
in reality constitute an equal risk for all agents.
An important distinction for our analysis is between individual
and social risks. Individual risks refer to individual sub-systems of the national economy whereas social risks relate to
society as a whole. We can only speak of social risks if the
random variable relates to public goods (or merit goods). The
quality of the environment constitutes such a public good.
Environmental pollution which is not known exactly in advance
can therefore be interpreted as a social risk.
Negative external effects of economic activities on the en-
vironment are loaded with risks for a number of reasons.
Pollutants such as persistent micro-pollutants accumulate over
a,lengthy period of time in the environment's media, in a man-
ner which is often not foreseeable (accumulation risk). One
example of this long-term effect is DDT, now banned in all
industrialised countries, becoming concentrated in the body's
fatty tissue via the food chain: 0.000003 parts per million
were measured in the water in Long Island Sound, New York; the
concentration in zooplankton, whose oils absorb DDT, is 0.04,
more than 1000 times stronger. The measurement recorded for
small fish in the same water was 0.5, for large fish 2.0 and in
fish-eating cormorants 25.0 ppm (Siebert 1973, p.19). Other
examples include the sedimentation of heavy metals in rivers
and pollutants becoming trapped in the soil. Pollutants
interact in the environment's media and between different
environmental media (risk of synergism). We are not yet fully
familiar with these synergisms, such as the formation of ozone
in the troposphere. A characteristic feature of several such
interdependences is their extremely slow development. For
instance, it takes twenty years or more for the highly stable
freon from our aerosol sprays to reach the ozone layer and
interact with the ozone under the influence of sunlight.
Besides accumulation and synergisms, the spatial transportation
of pollutants by environmental systems is plagued by uncer-
tainty insofar as existing calculations of their spread do not
suitably reflect the actual situation. Spreading in atmosphericsystems, ground-water systems or diffusion along food chains
(diffusion risk) are the cases in question here.
In addition to the accumulation of pollutants and the phenome-
non of interaction, the incidence of emissions and pollutants
ambient in the environment, in other words the extent of the
damage, remain in part unknown (risk of incidence or damage
risk). Pollution such as that affecting our forests only beco-
mes evident after a lengthy period of time. Nitrate enrichment
of the ground water or the accumulation of pollutants in the
soil likewise only become apparent after a certain time lapse.
The extent of the pollution remains unknown ex ante, and may
deviate from a mean value in either direction.
Particular features which may play an important role in the
uncertainty of environmental pollution are threshold effects
and irreversibilities. In other words, damages frequently only
become evident once certain thresholds ) are passed, causing
environmental systems to pass the "point of no return". Such
threshold effects may ultimately prove to be irreversible: the
original state of the environment cannot be reestablished, even
at immense cost or after laborious effort (irreversibility
risk), for instance when a species of animal or plant becomes
extinct.
3. Liability In a Semi - Coaaean World
An important feature of risk in the context of environmental
policy is the evaluation of risk. As a rule, using the environ-
ment as a public consumption good involves social risks; con-
sequently the problem arises by which institutional mechanism
social risks can be evaluated. Using the environment as a
receptacle of wastes, i.e. as a private good, may involve pri-
vate risks. The risk characteristic of environmental damage
gives rise to the question how environmental risks influence
the desired environmental quality, how environmental risks canbe limited and how the social risks of environmental utiliza-
tion should be signalled to the sub-systems of society, for
instance those causing pollution. Is liability law an appro-
priate institutional arrangenment to allocate risks and the
costs of risks reduction?
As an extreme theoretical framework of reference, we can consi-
der a situation where the problem of free-riders using the
environment is non-existent and exclusive property rights along
the lines of the Coase theorem (1960) apply. Then in a world
with one polluter and one pollutee and with negligible trans-
action costs, optimal environmental quality is attained by a
bargaining process. A bargaining solution internalizes risk.
If the pollutee has the property right to the environment, the
injured party will bargain along his or her marginal damage
curve (in Figure 1). If marginal damage is a random variable,
curves DD, D'D' or D''D''represent different estimates of the
mean of the damage. Note that each damage function reflects
different probability distributions of the damage for a
given level of pollution (shift of the damage function). With
an increase of emissions and for a given probability function,
the mean increases (movement along a damage function).
The pollutee will be keen to pass on to the polluter the
environmental risks and the costs of pollution abatement to
obtain a specified environmental quality, for instance OU (or
OU'if he expects a higher damage). The contract between the two
parties must be drawn up in such a way that the polluter com-
mits himself to a specified level of environmental quality, and
will consequently bear the risks associated with pollutants,
synergisms and diffusion. The polluter then bears the risks of
higher (SU') or lower (SU
f/) environmental quality.
If on the other hand, the polluter enjoys the property right to
the environment, he will attempt to pass on all or part of theup to a certain point (OU), and will not accept the risks asso-
ciated with accumulation, synergism and diffusion. With a










Figure 1If future environmental pollution is to be interpreted as a
risk in the narrower sense, in other words if economic agents
have objective probabilities for the likelihood of various con-
ditions arising in the world and if polluter and pollutee have
an identical risk preference, these measurable stochastic envi-
ronmental states are converted ex ante into deterministic
values. Environmental risks are fully anticipated, resulting in
optimum environmental allocation which takes quantifiable risks
into account appropriately *).
If clearly-defined liability rules for utilising the environ-
ment exist, the polluter bears the costs of abatement and com-
pensation payments for damage caused to the environment. Even
when environmental pollution only occurs at a point in the
future, the polluter is held unequivocally responsible for the
pollution. If clearly-defined rules of liability are applied,
the polluter will anticipate the pollution expected in the
future, and make an effort to avoid causing emissions and pol-
lution. It is then in the polluter's very own interest to pre-
vent environmental pollution. Strict adherence to the "polluter
pays" principle ensures that the principle of prevention is
observed. In an ideal institutional arrangement, the polluter
behaves as if he were the victim himself (Adams 1986, p. 144).
If environmental policy were based on the liability principle,
firms (and households) would be prompted to take out insurance
against causing environmental pollution; this would therefore
stimulate considerable demand for insurance services. An
insurance market would introduce incentives to avoid pollution,
for instance by appropriate insurance fees. It is rather rea-
listic that private firms have better information on abatement
technologies than governments. An insurance market will take
advantage of this informational asymmetry in favor of decentra-
lised subsystems.10
4. Transaction Coats, Incentives and Liability
In the semi - Coasean world of the previous section, transac-
tion costs are not explicitly taken into account. Transaction
costs become especially relevant in the context of persistent
micro-pollutants. With transaction costs, a decentralized
application of liability laws will give rise to the following
problems.
Incentives for Optimal Care. The problem of liability law is to
find an institutional setting in which the polluter takes opti-
mal care - as if he where the pollutee (accounting for dif-
ferences in tastes and economic conditions between polluter and
pollutee). The principal (the environmental policy maker) and
the agent (the polluter) have asymmetric information. It can be
assumed that the polluter has the better information on
abatement costs; the principal as a representative of the pol-
lutees is supposed to have better information on marginal
damage. The incentive system must prevent moral hazard pro-
blems, both with respect to abatement behavior and with respect
to providing information.
Forms of Liability and Incentives. The behavior of the polluter
depends on the forms of liability.
- Strict Liability implies that parties have to pay damages
irrespective of their neglicence. Then they have an incen-
tive to consider all potential harm.
- Neglicence rule require a prescribed level of "due" care,
and a party is held liable if due care has not been applied.
- Liability with standards. Liability only refers to pol-
lutants surpassing a standard. In this case, the individual
polluter only is liable for pollution beyond the standard.11
- Limits of liability may arise from legal statute or from the
liable assets of the firm. Such limits represent an upper
bound on the care taken.
The "burden of proof" is an important aspect of liability law.
In the case of strict liability, the burden of proof is with
the polluter. He therefore has to carry the transaction costs.
In the case of neglicence, the government or the pollutee have
the burden of proof.
Legal Costs. Liability law will attribute social costs only ex
post. With a well functioning institutional mechanism, ex post
allocation of social costs to the polluter will be anticipated
and correctly internalized ex ante. If however, social costs
are only allocated with a considerable time lag, the property
of efficiency is impaired. Liability law involves the legal
process. Especially in the case of continuously occuring emis-
sions, for instance from production, the transaction costs of
the legal system tend to be high. It is the characteristics of
a market economy that competing uses are not decided by
bureaucracies and courts but by markets. The environmental
problem is a scarcity problem, and consequently we should
attempt to introduce markets. There is the danger that liabi-
lity law, although establishing insurance markets, increases
the role of non-market mechanisms of allocation.12
Identifying the Polluter. Liability rules require that the
polluter can be identified without doubt. Here, however,
serious problems arise:
- There are many polluters; moreover the potential cause of a
damage may stem from different pollutants.
- Damage is caused by pollutants ambient in the environment; at
the origin, we can only measure emissions. Although diffusion
processes obey laws of nature, it is difficult to associate
pollutants ambient in the environment to emissions.
- Damages only occur with considerable time lags.
These arguments suggest that in the case of many polluters and
many pollutants liability rules have to allow an attribution of
damages to polluters on a statistical basis, that is using sta-
tistical probabilities. A problem of long-run damages is that
firms only have limited assets and that they may change their
legal status or may cease to exist. It is an open question to
what extent liability laws define exit conditions for firms.
Strategic Behavior of the Polluter. The individual polluter has
the option to act as a free-rider by not providing all relevant
information faithfully. The policy maker devising an institu-
tional setting does not have access to the same information as
the individual polluter. Information between principal and
agent is distributed assymetrically. It is rather in the
interest of the polluter to play down his or her role in
causing environmental pollution. The situation therefore boils
down to finding such institutional arrangements of risk alloca-
tion as will avoid distorting information and fending off the
free-rider approach of using the environment as a recipient for
waste. The institutional arrangement must be fit to transform
stochastic into deterministic variables. If the polluter has
the option to behave strategically, environmental quality tar-13
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gets are not correctly signalled to the subsystems of an eco-
nomy. Moreover the individuals using the environment or a
public consumption good may behave as a free rider when asked
to reveal their "true" preferences and their willingness to
pay.
The Extent of Damage. Pollution will not only cause a damage
for a specific pollutee, but for a number of pollutees. Here
the problem arises whether the damage is to be evaluated indi-
vidually or by some method of aggregation, that is whether a
horizontal or a vertical aggregation of the individual's wil-
lingness to pay has to be applied. Legally and constitu-
tionally, the problem arises who has the right to go to court
and whether a collective court action is allowed. Besides a
damage for more than one person, ecological damages may arise
that are not particular to a specific person, at least not
today. Liability laws must find a way to account for ecological
damages.
Insurance Markets. An important ingredient of liability law is
that an insurance market actually will develop. Then incentives
will be introduced into the economic system to prevent pol-
lutants and damages, and with efficient insurance markets,
technological information will come to the fore. If environmen-
tal damages cannot be attributed to the individual polluter, if
the diffusion and the accumulation of pollutants over time are
not clearly tracable and if institutional substitutes to spe-
cify causality cannot be developed, insurance firms may be
reluctant to take over environmental risks. It is a prerequi-
site for establishing an insurance market that risks can be
calculated and that stochastic variables can be transformed
into deterministic values. "Creeping" damages (Allmahlichkeits-
schaden) that only develop over time and damages of which a
statistical mean cannot be determined do not represent a rele-
vant basis for the insurance industry. These damages are not
ensurable. Another aspect of insurability is that damages are14
not too specific so that risk can be spread by insurance over
many cases. Yet another issue is that the risk to which a pol-
luter is exposed is limited by the assets of a firm or other
institutional restraints.
The Japanese Solution. Liability issues have the systematic
difficulty that there is only a statistical relationship bet-
ween emissions and damages. One method of solving the problem
of the responsibility of a specific polluter in practice is
simply by determining the level of emissions of individual
sources, but not the actual damages. This approach is adopted
in the environmental compensation principle applied in Japan.
The legislation from 1973 requires that compensation is paid
for certain environmental illnesses according to the severity
of the disorder. Damages are not allocated on a causal basis to
the polluter. Companies pay a levy into a fund on the basis of
their emissions. Those entitled to payments include for
instance persons who live in a region where a significant, sta-
tistical relationship between air pollution and specific ill-
nesses has been established.15
and other Policy Instruments
An important aspect is how liability law can be integrated into
the institutional arrangements of other policy instruments such
as emission taxes, discharge permits or regulation.
Consider a representive firm with a continuous flow of emis-
sions that it can abate with a cost function C (S
r) where S
r
are emissions reduced. Let a be the probability of an accident
with damage D with 0 < a (S
r) <1 , a' (S
r) <0
 5). The firm can
reduce the probability of a damage. The risk neutral firm
minimizes (Shavell 1984, 272)
C (S
r) + a (S
r) D (1)
so that optimal abatement is given by




which implicitly defines optimal abatement as a function of D,
S
r (D), where S
r increases with D.
Figure 2 shows potential damage D and optimal reduction of
given emissions OS. Optimal reduction of emissions increases
with damage (Curve SB) . Note that curve SB depends on the


















If the assets of the firm place an upper limit on liability,
the effort of the polluter will be reduced to a curve DEF where
OA is determined by the assets of the firm. The assets of the
firm place an upper limit on the effort curve and shift it
upward relative to the optimal abatement case (Shavell 1984,
p.274). For a given potential damage, less abatement is under-
taken .
Instead of liability, an emission standard SS'limiting the
quantity of emissions can be established. Such a standard,
however, presupposes that firms to be regulated are rather
homogeneous and are clustered around a potential damage XY. If
such a distribution exists, a mean of permissable emissions can
be defined (if information on the clustering is available). Of
course, an emission tax yielding SS'or emission rights may be
applied instead. These price instruments have the advantage of
stimulating technological progress in abatement.
Environmental policy may use both a standard and liability law.
In Figure 3, a standard SS'is binding. Beyond the standard,
liability law applies where the vertical branch EF is deter-
mined by the assets of the firm.
Figure 2 and 3 may also be interpreted with respect to product
norms where SS'represents a product norm and DEF represents








and the Risk of
If we move away from the semi-Coasean world allowing for
transaction costs and limited information of the environmental
policy market, the problem arises which environmental quality
target is set in a world of uncertainty and how a quality tar-
get loaded with uncertainty can be signalled to the subsystems
of an economy.
When future environmental quality is uncertain, risk allocation
relates to two different problems: who will bear the risk of
environmental degradation, and who will bear the additional
costs of abatement if there is a decline in environmental qua-
lity? The answer to these questions varies according to the
approach to environmental policy.
When the environment is used free of charge, the pollutee (the
general public) bears the environmental risks; there is no
incentive to abate or prevent pollution, i.e. the costs of
abatement are not attributed to the polluter. The other extreme
of environmental policy, the principle of the common burden,
implies that the government bears the costs of environmental
risks because abatement of unexpected environmental pollution
must be financed by the government °).
The government also bears the costs of correcting environmental
risks if environmental policy follows a licensing approach
according to the state of the art. This is because in such a
policy approach uncertain effects of the environment in the
future cannot normally be blamed on the polluters. The govern-
ment may then be forced to subsidise abatement. Only if pre-
cautionary measures have been taken in the form of a preventive
environmental policy can the government succeed in passing on
all environmental risks to the polluter. With emission taxes20
and transferable emission rights, it may be easier to signal
new and unexpected scarcities.
If environmental policy is to avoid the responsibility for
environmental risks falling to the government, it is essential
for future environmental risks to be anticipated and built into
current scarcity prices. The principle of preventive environ-
mental policy means that ideally pollution must be prevented
(O'Riordan 1985; Rehbinder 1985; Simonis 1984). Environmental
policy must set incentives before problems evolve. The risk of
future environmental pollution is of particular significance
where the environmental pollution can no longer be cleaned up
by future generations at any expense (irreversibility). On the
other hand, if environmental pollution is reversible, preven-
tive policy only becomes an attractive course of action if
subsequent costs of cleaning up are greater than the current
cost of avoiding pollution.
The principle of preventive policy must primarily relate to the
target of environmental quality. For determining the target,
the principle of preventive policy means that environmental
policy must assess long-term pollution when determining the
desired environmental quality and set a tougher target of
environmental quality for expected environmental risks, because
such risks indicate that, other things being equal, it is more
improbable that a particular target of environmental quality
will be reached. With a higher risk of damage (curve D'D'in
Figure 1), a better environmental quality must be the target.
The evaluated future pollution must be incorporated into cur-
rent environmental scarcity prices. If environmental risks
exist, scarcity prices must be pushed up now (Siebert
1987a)
 7).
The basic question behind the principle of prevention is that
uncertain states in the world cannot by definition be foreseen.
This causes problems in securing a desired environmental qua-21
lity. Moreover, measures for environmental quality are plagued
by uncertainty as far as the behaviour of the polluter is con-
cerned. In addition, the economic art of applying the principle
of prevention consists in avoiding a frequent variation in the
attribution of abatement costs not foreseeable by the polluter.
Constancy in the incentive schemes and in the institutional
setting is an important prerequisite of environmental policy.
In the case of uncertain environmental pollution, just how far
the principle of preventive policy can in practice resolve the
conflicting targets of avoiding environmental risks on the one
hand and revising environmental measures ex post on the other
must remain open.
7. Liability and the CasuisticB of the Environmental Problem
Environmental policy approaches to persistent pollutants very
much depend on the specific environmental problem at hand. It
is therefore promising to develop a casuistics of the environ-
mental problem of persistent pollutants and to discuss the role
of liability law in the different cases. Then the following
cases have to be distinguished (Siebert 1987a, p.19).
Continuously arising Emissions in Production. In this case,
licencing (air quality management) and emission taxes (water
quality management) have been applied. Transferable emissions
rights proposed by economists have been used in the "bubble
concept".
Licensing processes enable the government to lay down the maxi-
mum permissable level of persistent emissions. In that
approach, the government has to control individual stacks. This
method is a typical means of air quality management in many
countries (Federal Republic of Germany, USA). Companies are
normally required to apply state-of-the-art abatement technolo-
gies . Permits are issued for as long as the environmental qua-22
lity in any particular region does not violate the legal limits
of ambient quality. Yet this requirement only applies to newly-
established companies, not to long-established ones (Siebert
1985a) for which grandfather-clauses apply. Regulations cannot
be changed rapidly if unexpected pollution arises; for example
the state of the art stipulated in the 1973 Federal German
Clean Air Act was not altered until 1986.
If environmental risks exist for persistent pollutants, the
government's expectations of these risks may be a reason to set
stricter quality targets. It can then issue additional permits
in the future. If the environment were to deteriorate more than
expected, the government might be forced to pay subsidies in
order to induce abatement. This would hold true if the institu-
tional setting cannot be changed quickly. If this is the case,
the government bears the abatement costs of environmental
risks.
In a world of uncertainty and economic change, the social
opportunity costs of a permit approach vary with the transfera-
bility of the permit. Transferable emissions licences or the
"bubble concept" in U.S. environmental policy offer the pollu-
ter scope for reducing the cost of abatement. The emitting
party in the bubble is left to decide which amounts of emis-
sions are to be disposed of at which source with the aid of
which technological process. Environmental policy is not orien-
ted to the individual stack, but tied to the emission amounts
stipulated for the bubble as a whole. Such a flexible approach
introduces incentives to improve the abatement technology; con-
sequently, it puts less pressure on environmental policy to
bear the abatement costs of uncertain environmental determina-
tion.
In principle, liability law introduces an incentive to improve
technologies of abatement into a permit system. However, if
emissions arise on a continuous basis in production activities,23
liability law is difficult to apply. Often, the individual pol-
luter is not known, a specific damage can have many causes, and
transaction costs are high. It is hard for the pollutee to pro-
vide proof. If strict liability shifts the burden of proof to
the polluter, he has to show that damages are not caused by
him. If it is correct that there is only a statistical connec-
tion between emissions and damages, then this proof usually
cannot be successful. I follow Adams (1986) that such a rever-
sal of the burden of proof with continously arising emissions
may lead to an "excess liability" of the polluter. Emission
licences, preferably transferable, or emission taxes may be the
relevant policy instrument.
Thus, in the case of activity liability, the existing policy
instruments cannot be easily substituted by liability law. A
different approach would be to give liability rules a more pro-
minent role in the context of a licencing approach. One way is
to apply liability once standards are surpassed. This approach
has the disadvantage that technological incentives are not
institutionalized within the given standard. Moreover, in set-
ting the standards, the government carries the risk of environ-
mental degradation because standards cannot be easily changed.
The more important question is whether arrangements can be
found in which liability laws are made more biting without
doing away with the licencing approach °).
Emission taxes have been used in water quality management when
a continuous flow of pollutants occurs. Emission taxes can also
be applied to air pollutants. Levying a tax on emissions
discharged into the environment (for instance per ton of SO2)
is designed to correct the discrepancy between individual and
social costs. At the same time, an incentive is introduced into
the market economy to treat the environment as a recipient of
pollutants with greater respect. The advantage of emissions
taxes is that they define the conditions of the environmental
scarcity better and introduce price leverage in order to solve24
environmental problems. Firms are inspired to devise new
methods of abatement. One important condition for introducing
emissions taxes is that such a tax can only provide the correct
incentive if linked to the amount of emissions, e.g. per ton of
SC>2 • A general environment tax such as a forestry levy does not
provide any incentive to avoid creating pollutants; such as a
tax is merely a financing method.
The government bears the costs of correcting environmental
deterioration when emissions taxes are imposed if the emissions
tax or scarcity price cannot be adjusted quickly in the politi-
cal process to new scarcity conditions. The discussions sur-
rounding the German Waste Water Act and its introduction have
shown that it can take 10 years or more to plan, pass and
enforce such an act. However, a change in scarcity prices must
not take such a long time. Arrangements whereby the desired
environmental quality is determined by parliament and emissions
tax rates by the government should therefore be considered.
Such a solution could entail environmental policy automatically
correcting allocations for unforeseen environmental pollution
in the form of adjustments to emissions taxes. In such a scena-
rio the costs of correcting environmental risks would quickly
be attributed to the polluter. At the same time, incentives
would be introduced to improve environmental quality.
In the case of emission taxes, a similar problem arises as in
the licencing process. It is difficult to imagine that liabi-
lity can dominate the emission taxes because the transaction
costs of the liability system will be too high.
The better environmental policy succeeds in adapting instru-
ments of environmental policy such as emissions standards,
emissions licences and emissions taxes to new or unexpected
environmental shortages, the shorter the period for which the
state bears the costs of unexpected environmental deteriora-25
tion. When these instruments cannot be rapidly adapted, the
state is left bearing the costs of environmental risks ^).
Continuously arising Emissions in Consumption. When pollutants
arise in consumption activities (traffic, heating), it seems to
be difficult to apply emission licences or emission taxes due
to extremely high monitoring costs. Then product norms (for
cars, chimneys) tend to be the appropriate policy instrument.
Liability law seems to be impracticable, mainly due to the
transaction costs. In this case, it is extremely difficult to
alter environmental policy if unforeseen environmental disrup-
tions show up. Thus, in the case of emissions from production
and consumption, activity liability does not seem to be a too
promising approach.
Pollutants bound in consumption goods. When pollutants are con-
tained in consumption goods, they may represent a health hazard
to consumers. Liability law would show up in the form of pro-
duct liability. As a policy instrument, product liability com-
petes with product norms.
Pollutants bound in Discharged Goods. When pollutants are con-
tained in durable consumption or in investment goods and are
returned to the environment when discarded (the icebox with
freon), liability law would have to be framed as environmental
liability. The problem then is who can go to court in environ-
mental disputes.
Environmental Accidents. When pollutants are discharged into
the environment on an accidental basis as in the Bhopal,
Seveso, Sandoz cases, the effects and the occurrence of an
accident are unknown. Consequently, environmental accidents
cannot be regulated ex-ante because an accident cannot be
clearly defined. Accident liability brings out the advantage of
liability law.26
Vintage damages. A special problem arising from the liability
principle relates to "old" or historic damages. First, it may
no longer be possible to trace the polluters, for instance of
the large number of dumps closed at the end of the seventies in
the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. Second,
it may no longer be possible to bring polluters to justice
because they ceased to exist, for instance those who exploited
lead mines back in the Middle Ages. Vintage liability is not
possible.
Other modes of financing old damages such as the "super fund"
in the USA do not constitute an application of the liability
principle. They are rather a means of establishing as broad a
base of financing as possible, and are therefore not excessive
for the individual company. A feature of such proposals is that
they provide no incentive to avoid pollution.
8. Summary
Liability is a fascinating environmental policy instrument
because it allows a decentralized way of internalizing externa-
lities. Moreover, liability rules can be applied when other
policy instruments cannot be clearly defined due to an uncer-
tain state of the world. In a semi-Coasean context with clearly
defined property rights, stochastic variables are transformed
into deterministic values. In reality, however, transaction
costs play an important role. Legal costs, identifying the pol-
luter, asymmetric information on abatement costs between the
policy maker as principal and the polluter as agent are cases
in point. Besides transaction costs, the role of liability must
be evaluated in the context of other environmental policy
instruments with respect to two questions: How do firms react
to liability? And: Who carries the social risk of environmental27
degradation when different policy instruments are being used. A
casuistics of the problem of persistent pollutants is developed
where activity liability, product liability, accident liability
and vintage liability are distinguished.28
1 This is in line with the actual German environmental policy
which attempts to use liability laws as a vehicle to intro-
duce more emission - saving incentives into environmental
policy.
2 See Govers, Hegemann and Aiking, this volume
3 Economists are used to marginal analysis in the neighbourhood
of an equilibrium. If an independent variable is changed a
little bit, how is the dependent variable on the system as a
whole affected? The natural scientist is acquainted with a
phenomenon that a marginal variation may lead to a change in
quality, for instance altering water into vapor.
4 Then DD is the mean of environmental damage for different
levels of emissions.
5 Note that S
r here only affects the probability a . It can also
be assumed that S
r reduces D as well.
6 If the common burden principle is applied, it may neverthe-
less happen that the government passes on the environmental
risks to the general public if it remains inactive. Subsidies
evoke similar arguments to the common burden principle.
Subsidies also mean that the costs are not allocated to the
polluter; instead, they almost always promote the commodity
produced by pollution-intensive methods. The state carries
the risks of environmental pollution, since decentralised
units expect extra subsidies once new risks take effect.
Moreover, experience has shown that subsidies are difficult
to eliminate. The more environmental policy is dominated by
the common burden principle and subsidies, the weaker the
incentive to avoid pollution, the greater the environmental
risks to society and the lower the demand for private
insurance cover.
7 The political discussion on fundamental principles of
environmental policy will occasionally create the impression
of a contradiction between the polluter principle and that of
prevention. If the principle of preventive policy is
interpreted with regard to the target environmental quality,
this constitutes applying the "polluter pays" principle for
future environmental pollution. Both principles are consis-
tant with each other.
8 I do not see a practical way to introduce liability into the
licencing procedure when transaction costs are taken into
account.
9 However, it must be granted that the spatial dimension of the
bubble - controlled trading - may be negatively affected by
risks, unless we solve the issue whether the buyer or the
seller of the licence is liable. Transferable emission
licences for the bubble concept may have a basic advantage in
incorporating liability aspects: They may be instrumental in
getting the polluters used to think in terms of environmental
scarcity and in terms of prices of transferable emission
licences. If so, the government may be able to transmit new
scarcities in the case of unforeseen environmental effects
quickly to the polluter.29
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